Ja venäläiset itsekin myöntää, että oma taistelutapa johtaa raskaisiin tappioihin ja sitä kauttaa valtavaan osaamisvajeeseen. Ukraina sotii eri tavalla mikä säästää osaajia.
Russian military blogger in Donbas, Murz describes Ukrainian vs Russian junior and mid-level officer losses and how Ukraine is far better at preventing them by keeping them away from the frontline. This isn't being resolved and the effect is accumulating. Super long post, the source can be found here:
https://t.me/wehearfromyanina/2553…,
https://t.me/wehearfromyanina/2554…
[start] "An officer of one of the DPR brigades last summer briefly described to me the structure of the losses of their infantry approximately as follows. The officers who had officer ranks on February 24, 22 in platoons and companies basically finished Volnovakha, so it was mostly sergeants who were leading in Mariupol. In Mariupol, the sergeants ran out; in the summer, most often the most experienced fighter was the squad lead.
When in Mariupol the heavily battered infantry began to be "diluted" with mobilised, the "diluted" groups on the battlefield became unproductive - due to the high percentage of "mobilised" in the group, more or less experienced fighters spent all the time and energy to prevent panic / not allow these mobilised ones to wander around.
[…]
Since then, the losses in our junior command staff have not greatly decreased, and for some reason there is simply no time for many to train people at the required level. So now
I will once again say a compliment to our enemy (for which fragile minds regularly try to criticise me), but, alas,
the fact is that the enemy managed to adapt to the fact that he would have to suffer heavy losses in the infantry. And he keeps company commanders as far as possible from the epicenter of the battle, and even tries not to exchange platoon commanders unless absolutely necessary. Battalion commanders and brigade commanders generally sit in the rear, look at the screens of cameras, drones and ground reporters, listen to radio broadcasts, and command based on the information received in this way. Company and platoon officers, in fact, also monitor the adventures of their troops remotely, from shelters, they see the situation, they listen to the broadcast. As a result, it seems that both sides are doing the same thing - they are bringing infantry under enemy artillery fire, which is being adjusted from a UAV, infantry fights for treeliness, strongholds and the ruins of populated areas, with the support of a small amount of vehicles.
Accordingly, suffering the most losses is someone who is: A. advancing (in the phase of “investment in victory in the operation”) b. has fewer drones with shorter range V. has (including as a consequence of paragraph b.) less effective artillery and MLRS d. has less experience in such actions Accordingly, these losses are all the more sensitive the greater the percentage of junior command personnel who were knocked out during battles. And the survival or non-survival of junior command personnel directly affects point “d”. The result on all points - despite point “a”, which favors greater losses for the enemy, the presence of a larger number of UAVs with a longer range of action and guided weapons with a longer range of action, as well as his ability to remove junior command personnel from attack...
Firstly, it makes the infantry losses of the sides numerically comparable, secondly, it allows the enemy to inflict damage in the depths of our battle formations more often and more accurately than we inflict on him, knocking out our equipment, artillery and military specialists. Thirdly, it makes our losses in the infantry more sensitive to us than the enemy’s losses in the infantry are sensitive to the enemy. It is not just easier for the enemy to replenish numerically due to the fact that he is undergoing total mobilization and to replenish himself qualitatively due to an extensive training system, but it is also easier to replenish structurally, because he is losing mainly those who can be trained very quickly and en masse. Accordingly, he at least does not reduce the quality of his management system, and even increases it.
A characteristic, so to speak, trace of the work of foreign instructors, which only a very lazy military propagandist on our part did not laugh at during the “Minsk” period and even during the SMO. How do we, not only not accumulating, but losing experience and quality of infantry control due to the constant removal of junior command personnel by the enemy, manage to incur unnecessary losses is also no secret.
Right while writing this text, a person laid out perhaps the most common basic scenario for wasting personnel: ...
And it just so happens that when something is lost somewhere on the site, pride does not allow report it, foreseeing the upcoming humiliation. And in order to smooth out the picture, they try to take back the lost territory. Since there is little time for adjustment, preparations for the event are chaotic. Loss of personnel is not as bad as loss of piece of land, so scout team go ahead. In the Laotian army, it is a national custom to send scouts (and who else?) to recapture the positions. In addition, people who died simultaneously can be stretched out over time, as if these were average losses. [end quote]
This is approximately the actual situation regarding losses, dear fans of videos from Ukrainian cemeteries."
